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Local Adaptation of the
California Administrative Procedure Act
-A Plea for Research and Study
by HYNRY A. Di, rz*
THE subject of this article is so broad and of such importance that
the writer approaches it with trepidation. As the distinguished and
redoubtable Dean Prosser says in his casebook on torts, speaking of
the relation between authority of law and privilege: "The defense of
legal authority is a subject for a course, a casebook and a text in itself.
It can only be touched upon here."' Certainly the subject matter of
this article far transcends that of the ordinary law review article. We
will nevertheless touch upon some problems, pose some questions and
make some suggestions. It is hoped that interest will be whetted,
thought provoked, investigation and research begun.
Two questions are immediately apparent: Is there a need for uni-
formity in local administrative proceedings, and should research and
surveys be begun so that firm conclusions may be drawn? Based upon
experience and observation, the writer answers these questions with
an unqualified "yes." In large measure, each county, city or other
local agency has its own informal, non-prescribed method of conduct-
ing proceedings. 'Few local agencies have administrative rules or reg-
ulations, reliance for guidance more often than not being sought in
the almost abominable Roberts, Rules of Order. Further, if definitive
answers to these questions are not sought now, it is not an unreason-
able prediction that the problems unsolved will haunt the California
courts, legislators, administrators, administrative agencies and lawyers
for years to come.
In 1945, acting on a report submitted by the Judicial Council,
2
the Legislature of California adopted an Administrative Procedure
Acts applying only to certain enumerated state agencies and not to
local agencies.4 The Act is divided into three chapters: Chapter 4
*Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara; former County Counsel, San Diego
County; former Assistant Attorney General, State of California.
I PRossER & SmrrH, CASES ON TORTS 155 (3d ed. 1963).
2 TENTH BmNNAL R.EpoRT, JuDiciAL. CouNcrL. OF CATOJnoRu (1944).
3 CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 11370-528. For some excellent articles a decade after its
enactment, see 44 CALw. L. REv. 189-339 (1956).
4 CAL. Gov. CODE: §§ 11370-528, 11500(a), 11523. Allen v. Humboldt County
Board ofUSupervisors, 220 A.C.A. 890, 34 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1963).
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provides for the Office of Administrative Procedure; Chapter 4.5 deals
with judicial review and procedure for adoption, filing and publica-
tion of each agency's rules and regulations, and provides for the
California Administrative Register and Code; and Chapter 5 sets
forth the rules of procedure for administrative adjudication. The
procedure for judicial review by writ of mandate is found in the
Code of Civil Procedure.5
Originally the legislature established the Office of Administrative
Procedure within the Department of Professional and Vocational
Standards as a relatively loose member of that agency, but in 1963 it
was transferred to the newly established Department of General Serv-
ices. The reason for the transfer was to avoid what the military would
call "command influence," the practitioner "agency oriented decisions,"
and courts and writers "incompatible functions," or the need for "sep-
aration of functions."6 The transfer was an attempt to resolve one of
the basic problems of fairness in the administration of justice by state
administrative agencies in California.
A procedure act of scope and depth could not, of course, be im-
mediately enacted to more efficiently administer the work of local
agencies. Nor would an immediate attempt to make a redrafted ver-
sion of the California Administrative Procedure Act applicable to local
administrative agencies be feasible. Because of the complex problems
involved, the preparation of such an act will require years of study,
which should begin now.
The Office of Administrative Procedure is required to conduct
continuing studies in the field of administrative law.7 Although the
studies emanating from this office will have primary application to
the problems confronted by state agencies, they also will be an inval-
uable aid in the search for solutions to the administrative law problems
peculiar to local agencies. What follows is designed to call attention
to some of the problems involved in formulating a policy for local ad-
ministrative procedure.
The Hearing Officer
The touchstone of fairness under the California Administrative
Procedure Act is the hearing officer system.8 This is the essential
element protecting the administrative hearing against bias and influ-
5 CAL. CODE Civ. Pnoc. § 1094.5.
G For a complete discussion of this problem see 2 DAvis, ADnm'zmAsTiRW LAW
§§ 13.01-.11 (1958).
7 CAL. GOV. CODE § 11370.5.
8 See CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 11502, 11512.
Feb., 1964] LOCAL ADAPTATION OF APA
ence. There is but one master, the conscience of the hearing officer.
But where will the local agency obtain qualified hearing officers? From
the state? The state is undermanned now. Who is going to pay for
them? Can Inyo County, with its small population and meager tax
base, support the cost of a hearing officer in every case requiring a
hearing, be it the dismissal of an employee, a zoning board hearing,
revocation of one of the various types of licenses, or a hearing by the
board of supervisors sitting as a board of equalization? It would ap-
pear not. Nor would it appear that many counties could sustain such
a cost burden. Can the system of costs, under which the Office of
Administrative Procedure furnishes officers by so-called equitable ap-
portionment among the state agencies, be adapted to local agencies?
A whole new set of problems is apparent. Nevertheless, the hearing
officer system is probably the fairest yet devised and should be a
goal, unless some suitable substitute is found. And it is to be noted
that the hearing officer problem is only one facet of the added per-
sonnel and expense problems in any mandatory enactment.
The Trial-Type Hearing
The California legislature has specifically designated those agen-
cies which are to conduct proceedings under the Act.9 A hearing may
be required when one of the designated agencies 1) revokes, sus-
pends, limits or conditions a right, authority, license or privilege; 10
and 2) grants, issues or revokes a right, authority, license or privi-
lege."1 Stated more broadly, a hearing may be required upon refusal
to grant a right or revocation of a right.
Whether an administrative proceeding has satisfied the guarantee
of due process of law has been one of the most troublesome and slip-
pery areas of administrative law. Professor McCormick says in his
text on evidence: "One ventures the assertion the 'Presumption' is the
slipperiest member of the family of legal terms, except its first cousin,
'burden of proof.'"12 Paraphrased to apply to administrative law, it
could be said that, "The requirement of the opportunity to be heard
in an administrative agency action is one of the slipperiest areas of
administrative proceedings, surpassed only by its first cousin, the ad-
missibility of evidence in such" proceedings."
Obviously, a full trial-type hearing should not be required at the
local level for all changes in status of rights, authorities, licenses or
9 CAL. Gov. CODE § 11501.
10 CAL. Gov. CODE § 11503.
"x CAL. Gov. CODE § 11504.
12 McCo-mc, EVIDENCE 639 (1959).
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privileges, any more than it is required at the federal or state level.
The difficult problem is determining when a full hearing, partial hear-
ing, or no hearing at all is required. For instance, it is recognized by
the courts that there is a difference between the type of hearing
required for revocation of a license to practice medicine and of the
right to run a pool hall. In the former it is almost universally required
that there be a full trial-type hearing; in the latter there can be sum-
mary revocation.13 Problems of due process and of the right to be
heard exemplify the many problems that face the governing bodies
who must distinguish, categorize and standardize requirements for
hearings at the local level. For example, in California a board of
supervisors, when acting as a county board of equalization to deter-
mine questions relating to the equalization of tax assessments, 14 is
considered to be a quasi-judicial body.'5 The tax assessor, when
valuing property for taxation, exercises judicial functions.' 6 Should
a full trial-type hearing be granted in these cases? The two most
discussed cases with respect to state and local taxes and hearings
are Londoner v. Denver'7 and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Col-
orado."" In the Londoner case the Denver Board of Public Works
assessed the plaintiff's lands for the cost of paving a street and gave
him opportunity to file written complaints and objections, but not to
be heard. The Supreme Court held this was not enough. Bi-Metallic
was a suit by a real estate owner to enjoin state officers from increas-
ing the valuation of all taxable property in Denver by forty per cent,
without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme
Court unanimously held that a hearing was not necessary: "The Con-
stitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting
or an assembly of the whole. General statutes ...are passed that
affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point
of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard." 9
Professor Davis says: "The principle that distinguishes the Bi-
Metallic case from the Londoner case is that a party in a tax or
23 For an excellent short discussion of the licensing problem see GELLHOnN & BYSE,
ADi TrvE LAw CASEs 759-67 (4th ed. 1960). For a detailed discussion of the re-
quirement of the opportunity to be heard, see 1 DAvis, ADMnmTRArVE LAw § 7.01-.20
(1958).
14 See Universal Consolidated Oil Co. v. Byram, 25 Cal. 2d 353, 356, 153 P.2d 746
(1944).
15 Eastern-Columbia, Inc. v. Los Angeles County, 61 Cal. App. 2d 734, 143 P.2d
992 (1943).
16Younger v. Santa Cruz County, 68 Cal. 241, 9 Pac. 103 (1885).
'7210 U.S. 373 (1907).
18239 U.S. 441 (1915).
'19 Id. at 445.
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assessment case has a right to be heard when official action is based
upon 'individual grounds' but not necessarily when official action is
based upon general grounds, that is, when the facts are adjudicative
but not when they are legislative."20 Later Supreme Court cases tend
to confirm this principle.
Should we include our local boards of equalization and our as-
sessors in an administrative procedure act for local agencies? Can
the counties afford it?
The Phonographic Reporter
The Administrative Procedure Act requires each hearing to be
reported by a phonographic reporter.2' This requirement is, of course,
based on the fact that a person entitled to a quasi-judicial hearing is
entitled to a record, and further, that the record be available for
review purposes. Might not this added expense be prohibitive? And
there is the practical problem of the availability of qualified reporters.
There simply is not a sufficient number to be called upon. True, a
record should be made if there is a full trial type hearing.22 But
should the local agencies make a complete record in all cases where
the matter calls for but a speaking argument or merely a written
argument?
Judicial Notice
What a boon to the lawyer if the courts could take judicial notice
of local agencies' rules and regulations!
Federal courts are required to judicially notice federal adminis-
trative regulations appearing in the Federal Register.23 In California
it is provided that the courts, with respect to state departments and
agencies, "shall take judicial notice of the contents of the certified
copy of each regulation and of each order of repeal duly filed,"24 and
similarly of each regulation or notice of repeal printed in the Cali-
fornia Administrative Code or California Administrative Register.
25
On the other hand, judicial notice is not taken of rules and regula-
tions of local administrative bodies, nor until very recently of mu-
nicipal ordinances. Even now judicial notice of local ordinances is
20 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.04 (1958).
2 1 CAL. Gov. CODE § 11512(d).
22 See Carstens v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 572, 577, 158 Pac. 218 (1916); Nishldan v.
Long Beach, 103 Cal. App. 2d 749, 752, 230 P.2d 156 (1951); Kwock Jan Fat v. White,
253 U.S. 454 (1920).
23 Federal Register Act, 49 Stat. 502 (1935); 55 U.S.C. § 307 (1952).
24 CAL. GOV. CODE § 11383.
2 5 CAL. GoV. CODE § 11384.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15
LOCAL ADAPTATION OF APA
generally limited to the area of the particular municipal court's juris-
diction.2 6 The reason for the reluctance of the courts to take judicial
notice of local ordinances and rules and regulations of local agencies
is simply lack of adequate and easily accessible records. The reader
has probably already been frustrated in an attempt to locate, if they
exist at all, local administrative rules and regulations or local ordi-
nances. If he by chance located the material, he probably became
completely confounded by lack of an index or other method of locat-
ing a particular subject.
However, we should not be overly critical of local officials in this
regard. It was not too long ago that prosecutions were conducted
for violations of unpublished rules and regulations which were avail-
able only in the President's desk or some federal official's files.27
At the state level records are made accessible by statutory pro-
visions creating the California Administrative Code and the California
Administrative Register. 28 Counties, cities, and special districts, how-
ever, are woefully lacking in such provisions. Indeed, the second most
26 People v. Cowles, 142 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 865, 867, 298 P.2d 732, 733 (1956);
People v. Crittenden, 93 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 871, 877, 209 P.2d 161 (1949).
2 7 In particular there had not been devised, prior to NRA, any required,
authorized, or even standard method of publishing administrative rules or
decisions of any sort. It is true that executive orders (and codes were to be
issued as such) were filed with the Secretary of State and published every
year with the Statutes at Large. But it was not uncommon for the White House
to retain orders which it preferred to keep from public view. And the executive
orders embodying the codes were not (in many instances) even at the White
House but here and there in the desk drawers of NRA officials. Such was the
case with the Petroleum Code, challenged in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388 (1935). In that case the industry had used an unofficial copy pub-
lished by the so-called Code Authority, a body set up under each code to
assist NRA in administration. The Petroleum Code had been amended. When
the brief came to be written it occurred to the brief writer to examine the orig-
inals (which were found after some difficulty). He discovered the sickening
fact that by reason of a mistaken use of terms, the Code had been amended
out of existence. "Section 4 is amended to read as follows" was followed by only
the first paragraph of the Section. The second paragraph making violation of
production quotas unlawful had been omitted. The President immediately
supplied the missing provisions, thus making true the state of facts which had
been assumed by all persons and all courts to have existed. Nevertheless the
Supreme Court refused to treat the Code as properly before it. Those who
heard and participated in the argument were struck by the almost gleeful
eagerness with which the Court probed into the unsavory story (though it had
previously been completely advised). A valuable consequence was the Federal
Register Act, 49 Stat. 590 (1935), 44 U.S.C. §§ 301-314 (1949), which pro-
vides for publication of executive orders and rules and regulations in the daily
Federal Register.
JAFFE & NATHANs , An~immSTRAv LAW CAsEs 61 (2d ed. 1961).
28 CAL. Cov. CODE § 11380-427.
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populous county in the state today has an up-to-date, though some-
what limited, administrative code only because of the efforts of a
dedicated assistant county counsel and his equally dedicated secre-
tary, working primarily on their own time.29 This code is not, how-
ever, an administrative hearing procedure code, but prescribes general
provisions respecting jurisdiction and internal housekeeping functions
of county offices, boards and commissions. No survey to my knowl-
edge has been made of the number of counties that have compiled
such housekeeping material. Almost without doubt it is a minority,
and this applies equally to local agency rules and regulations where
they exist.
The doctrine of judicial notice should certainly be applied to local
ordinances, rules and regulations. Referring to the mandatory re-
quirement that courts take judicial notice of state agency rules and
regulations, one eminent legal writer says: "It would seem that the
same reasons of convenience which justify judicial notice of [state]
administrative regulations call for judicial notice of [municipal] or-
dinances, subject to procedural safeguards similar to those governing
notice of the law of foreign countries."30 The suggestion is of con-
siderable merit and is equally applicable to local administrative rules
and regulations. However, would it not in the long run be desirable
to study the feasibility of requiring proper codification, publication
and availability of local ordinances, rules and regulations so that judi-
cial notice could be taken of them in the same fashion as of state
administrative rules and regulations?31 Successful operation of the
judicial notice doctrine requires uniform codification, publication and
availability of these laws. This would be a major step forward in
uniformity, orderliness and efficiency in state as well as local gov-
ernment in all of its branches, judicial, legislative and executive. And
this is an area in which the legislature has power to act. The estab-
lishment of such a uniform procedure would solve one of the difficult
problems in drafting and adopting a uniform administrative procedure
act for local agencies.
Evidence
Do local administrative agencies know what is and what is not
legal evidence in administrative quasi-judicial proceedings? Does the
29Assistant County Counsel Robert G. Berrey drafted the present Administrative
Code of San Diego County.
a0 Whnw, CALIFOiErA EvDN-cE 62 (1958).
31 For an excellent article on judicial notice and the need for it, see McCormick,
Judicial Notice, 5 VAm. L. REv. 296 (1952).
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school board of X school district know about evidence? Does the
public health board of X city or county know about hearsay? One
could go on ad infinitum with a series of questions framed as above
with respect to local agencies. As a whole the answer would have to
be a categorical "No."
"It is today almost hornbook law that the common-law rules of
evidence are not, as such, binding upon administrative agencies, in
the absence of statutory provisions that they are to control ...... 32
Government Code section 11513(c) authorizes the use of hearsay
evidence in proceedings under the Administrative Procedure Act as
follows:
The hearing need not be conducted according to technical rules
relating to evidence and witnesses. Any relevant evidence shall be
admitted if it is the sort of evidence on which responsible persons are
accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs, regardless of the
existence of any common law or statutory rule which might make
improper the admission of such evidence over objection in civil ac-
tions. Hearsay evidence may be used for the purposes of supple-
menting or explaining any direct evidence but shall not be sufficient
in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over
objection in civil actions. The rules of privilege shall be effective to
the same extent that they are now or hereafter may be recognized in
civil actions and irrelevant and unduly repetitious evidence shall be
excluded.
In its report to the Governor and legislature the Judicial Council
gave its reasons for recommending the above-quoted section, which
it indicated would in effect be a codification of then existing law.83
Among reasons given were (1) to eliminate vagueness and (2) be-
cause evidentiary exclusionary rules, primarily devised to keep certain
types of evidence from untrained lay juries, are not necessary when
decision is made by experts in a particular field (the so-called ex-
pertise doctrine).
The general validity of this reasoning as to state agencies has
been borne out by the operation of the Administrative Procedure Act
over the past two decades. Let us apply the reasoning to the local
agency. I would venture to say that most lawyers faced with admin-
istrative law evidence problems rely in large measure upon the deci-
sions construing the Act as a guide to proper rulings and procedure,
so any vagueness as to admissibility of evidence under the Act may at
least be headed for reasonable clarity and standardization. However,
32 Schwartz, A Decade of Administrative Law 1942-1951-Evidence, 51 Mixc. L.
Bxv. 775, 815-18 (1953).
33 TENTH BmNL-r. REPoT, JuD IcLA CouNciL. OF Ciom.u 21 (1944).
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has the second reason, "expertise," the same validity with respect to
local agencies as it has to state agencies? Not only are state agencies
in large measure composed of experts in their respective fields, but
also they have the advantage of civil service staffs long trained in
their fields of endeavor. Most important, with few exceptions they are
bound by the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act requir-
ing a hearing officer trained in law and thoroughly competent to rule
on the admissibility of evidence. Local boards on the other hand are
generally composed of non-expert, civic-minded individuals, working
without the benefit of trained staffs. The writer questions whether
the administrative law doctrine of "expertise" applies to local agencies.
It does not follow, however, that a standard rule on the admissibility
of evidence in proceedings before local administrative agencies should
not be adopted.
Two Hats
The theory of separation of functions is fairness. Duties must be
separated so that there can be no incompatibility of purpose, no prose-
cution or agency oriented interests to prevent an objective decision.
At the national level agencies having their own counsel have been
separated from the prosecutor in order to prevent the prosecutor from
having an ex parte influence upon final decisions. 34 In California the
problem has been solved under the Administrative Procedure Act by
the establishment of independent hearing officers. The attorney gen-
eral (who is counsel for most of the agencies bound by the Act) has
been removed from the extremely difficult, delicate, and often embar-
rassing position of furnishing the legal advisor to the board, as well
as counsel to prosecute. No such separation of functions has taken
place at the local level, nor will it take place for some years to come.
For instance, every district attorney exercising civil law functions and
every county counsel finds himself in a delicate position when civil
service employees are to be disciplined or licenses revoked. Staffs are
generally not adequate in numbers, and a complete divorce of advo-
cate from prosecutor is virtually impossible to attain. In many offices
where duties have become somewhat loosely sectionalized the regular
advisor to the board or commission acts as the advisor to the board
in the disciplinary proceeding, and an independent deputy from an-
other section is assigned to prosecute. Some offices reverse this process.
Because of the integrity of public lawyers in this state there has been
remarkably little criticism of the situation. The small offices of one,
34 GELLHORN & BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES 1018-29, 1024 (4th ed. 1960).
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two or slightly more deputies, however, are placed in an intolerable
position under today's procedures.
Some Suggestions
How should this problem be approached? An administrative pro-
cedure system peculiarly adapted to the agencies of the State of Cal-
ifornia has operated successfully for almost two decades. It has been
so generally accepted, although not completely undamned, that some
local agencies voluntarily are using state hearing officers. The state
administrative agency survey was initiated by a legislative direction to
the Judicial Council to conduct a study and submit a report.8 5 Piece-
meal legislation was also part of its beginning; in 1941 the legislature
enacted sections 720 to 724.4 of the then Political Code, providing for
the publication by a Codification Board of administrative rules and
regulations in a California Administrative Code.36 The plan worked
successfully. Planning for procedure of local administrative agencies
is fraught with greater dangers and more diverse problems than those
faced in the state study. The body that spawned the California Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act did not, for instance, have to concern itself
with other than state agencies. A commission, board, or council deal-
ing with local administrative agencies will be confronted with counties,
cities and counties, cities, and other local agencies. It will find that
it must plan for fifty-eight boards of supervisors, innumerable city
governing bodies, elected officials of fifty-eight counties and innumer-
able cities; it will collide with hundreds of department heads of various
city and county departments, each with its own concern and interest
as well as political power; it will be greeted by the state legislative
representatives of each of these areas. There will also be difficult
problems with respect to population, tax base, budgets, numberless
variations in present procedure, vast differences in areas of jurisdic-
tion of agencies, consolidated duties and agencies, charter counties,
general law counties, home rule, the bench, and the bar. But given
time these are not insurmountable obstacles. If they are, we are really
in a decadent stage of democratic government.
First, it would appear that the legislature should set up a care-
fully selected representative body to study the problem and to repor
its conclusions and recommendations. Annual reports should be made,
but a reasonable deadline for its conclusions should be set. This body,
whatever it is to be called, should primarily consist of members of
35 Cal. Stat. 1941, ch. 1190; Cal. Stat. 1943, ch. 991; DEuNo'S GENERAL, LAws,
1944, Act 40; TENm BrENrsL REPoRT, JUDmcL COUNCIL oF C AwOPNIA (1944).36 Tmp BInNma-L REPORT, JUDicIAL CouNciL OF CA I.FoR i (1944).
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the bench and bar, including perhaps several public lawyers who are
not only members of the bar but also highly knowledgeable in this
field. Other representatives on the body should come from the gov-
erning bodies of counties and cities. Political scientists and legal edu-
cators are a fertile source of thought and research in government, and
should be considered as possible members. Ample funds should be
appropriated for the study, sufficient powers delegated to it to con-
duct its investigation, and a skilled staff made available. To go into
further details here would be fruitless because the legislature in its
wisdom will, in any event, do as it thinks best.
Second, piecemeal legislation should be considered, such as a
uniform act requiring codification, publication and availability of local
ordinances, and local agency rules and regulations.
Third, there could be set forth in one of the codes a model ad-
ministrative hearing procedure, perhaps with alternative provisions,
which could be adopted by cities and counties by reference. The
persuasive value of this suggestion is that the opportunity for cities
and counties to adopt a convenient procedure by reference would tend
to create uniformity in county and city administrative hearings and
yet would not eliminate home rule.
Fourth, the above suggestions are but a beginning. If this short
article does not result in other articles on local administrative agency
procedure in California and in wide divergences of opinion then it has
failed its purpose. The subject deserves the best minds to cogitate,
contemplate, meditate, muse, reflect, write and act upon it. May they.
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